Contrary to what is often claimed, the Iranian leadership did not necessarily emerge from the conflict stronger. While the country’s foreign policy situation has improved to some extent, the regime is under severe domestic pressure due to extensive war damage, high unemployment, and rising prices. The political and economic crisis is also exacerbating the already difficult situation facing the population. Furthermore, according to Fathollah-Nejad’s assessment, the funds promised for reconstruction would initially benefit the regime and support its political goals.
Fathollah-Nejad views the justification for the war—Iran’s nuclear program—primarily as a pretext. According to him, Israel and the U.S. did not seek regime change, but rather attempted to weaken Iran’s military capabilities, particularly its missile program. Whether this goal has been achieved, however, appears questionable. On the nuclear issue, he considers it conceivable that Tehran might offer a moratorium on uranium enrichment. Even in the event of an agreement, however, security in the Strait of Hormuz would remain at risk in the long term.
Fathollah-Nejad views diplomatic relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states as being under sustained strain. He explains that a large portion of Iran’s retaliatory strikes were directed against these states. At the same time, he notes, the Gulf states have no interest in further escalation of the conflict. They also fear that key security issues would not be adequately addressed in any potential negotiations.